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GLOSSARY
This case centers on industrial filter machines and their
related drawings.

To facilitate reference thereto, the appellee

and cross-appellant EIMCO provides the following glossary of
terms for the convenience of the court.

(R. 4047-73.)

Detail Drawings - The term "detail drawings11 refers to
drawings which contain the detailed manufacturing
dimensions, tolerances and the like of an industrial
machine, part or portion thereof. (R. 2799, 5 E3,
5140.)
Drum Filter - The term "drum filter" refers to a hollow,
slowly rotating drum with plastic grids or grates
secured to its outside surface. A filter media cloth
is wrapped about the drum over the grids. A slurry is
directed over the drum surface near its top as the drum
turns. The slurry flows downward over the filter while
a vacuum is drawn through openings in a portion of the
drum surface to draw the liquid into the drum. In
turn, a solid or cake remains, and it is scraped off as
the drum turns. The cake is collected for transport
and further processing. A typical drum filter may be
10 to 14 feet in diameter and 10 to 20 feet in width.
(R. 4055, 4061-67.)
Extractor - The term "extractor" refers to a horizontal belt
filter which is described more fully hereafter. (R.
4048-4052.)
GA Drawings - The term "GA drawings" mean "general
arrangement" or "general assembly" drawings which both
depict general information about a product or assembly
and not the details for manufacture. (R. 4905,
5139-40.)
General Arrangement Drawings - The term "general arrangement
drawings" refers to illustrations or drawings which are
sometimes called blueprints to present general
information about the arrangement of an installation.
For example, sufficient general dimensions may be
provided so a customer is able to make a concrete pad
sufficient to support the purchased machine. (R. 4905,
5139-40.)
General Assembly Drawings - The term "general assembly
drawings" refers to illustrations or drawings which are
sometimes called blueprints to present the general
viii

configuration (or assembly) of the basic components of
a machine or of selected portions thereof to better
understand, for example, the construction or use of a
machine. (R. 2799, 5 E3.)
Horizontal Belt Filter - The term "horizontal belt filter"
refers to a filter with an endless belt that extends
between a front drive roller or pulley and a rear or
tail pulley similar to a conventional conveyor belt.
The belt has raised ribs which extend inwardly from the
outside edges toward drain holes positioned generally
in the middle. A cloth (called media) is wrapped over
the belt. A slurry (e.g., ground coal and water) flows
onto the cloth. The liquid drains into the grooves
between the ribs and is sucked down through the belt
holes by a vacuum leaving a cake (i.e., the solids) on
the media. The cake is scraped off or falls off the
belt which is continuously rotating much like a
conveyor. The cake is transported for further
processing. The filter may be said to separate solids
from liquids or "extract" and is thus called an
"extractor." Horizontal belt filters are frequently
described by the size of the belt. For example a "112"
filter has a belt that is one foot wide and extends
between the front and rear pulleys which are about 12
feet apart. Horizontal belt filters vary widely in
size with belts being as much as 10 to 15 feet wide and
in the vicinity of 20 feet long. (R. 4048-51.)
Shriver Press - The term "shriver press" refers to a filter
in which a slurry is poured into an area between filter
plates which are then pressed to mechanically squeeze
out the liquid to leave a dry cake. (R. 5239.)

ix

REFERENCE TO THE RECORD
The record in this case includes pleadings, exhibits and
transcripts from multiple court proceedings as follows:
R. 0001-3645, 7032-152

Pleading documents including orders,
findings, judgments, etc.

R. 3848-926, 3999-5637

Trial Transcript, October 3-18, 1989

R. 5638-707

Bench decision, November 7, 1989

R. 3927-98

Transcript of hearing on motion to join
lone Callahan, December 6, 1990
Transcript of hearing on damages
December 20, 1990
Trial transcript of Contempt Proceedings
held on March 29, 1991

R. 7154-238
R. 3646-846
R. 7239-76

Transcript of hearing on motion to
increase bond, July 8, 1991

R. nnb

Transcript of hearing on Writ of
Execution, August 6, 1991, (see also
App. I)

Exhibits 0001
through 103,846

Trial exhibits including many
confidential drawings

Exhibits A-Q

Exhibits in post trial proceedings
including the contempt trial of
March 29, 1991

Reference to the above record is made by using the following
abbreviations:
(R. xxxx)

The paginated record and transcripts

(R. nnb)

Not Numbered Below - References to Record of the
trial court not yet numbered by the court.

(Ex. xxxx)

Exhibits admitted at either the trial as to
liability or at the contempt trial

(Add. xx)

The addenda to EIMCO's MAIN BRIEF filed on June 18,
1992.

x

(App. xx)

Appendices attached to this Brief Responding To
Intervenor O H .
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APPENDIX INDEX
Date

Description

United States Constitution, Amendment
XIV, § 1; Utah Constitution, Article I,
S 7
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 12,
19, 20, 21, 24, 69
3/4/93
Writ of Execution; Writ of Execution
3/18/93
Motion to Quash Plaintiffs Writs of
Execution and Assistance Dated 3/4/93
3/31/93
Opposition to Motion to Quash
4/09/93
Minute Entry; Order (denying Motion to
Quash of 6/5/93)
1/14/90
Minutes of the Organizational Meeting of
the Directors of C-H Industries, Inc.,
January 1990
4/27/91
Minutes of the Special Meeting of the
Directors of C-H Industries, Inc., April
1991
8/6/91
Reporters Transcript on Appeal, pages
1, 2, 23, 24 (Hearing on Writ of
Execution)
9/12/91
Motion to Compel Custodian to Turn Over
Property of the Estate
9/25/91
Transcript of Hearing in Bankruptcy
Court, pages 93-96
10/18/91 Order Directing Custodian To Turnover
Property
Eimco Exhibits Produced From C-H Assets
Seized by Constable Sindt's Office
3/3/93
Order Dismissing Bankruptcy Case
11/12/92 Complaint
11/18/91 Notice of Commencement of Case Under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code,
Meeting of Creditors, and Filing of
Dates; In re Gerald Callahan, Voluntary
Petition
3/5/93
a) Motion for Preliminary Injunction
b) Transcript of Hearing pp. 1-7
3/15/93
Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction
8/17/88
Complaint
1/14/92
Order (Consolidation of Contempt Appeal
with Final Judgment)
9/30/92
Order (Reference of case to Court of
Appeals)
11/9/89
a) In re G&G Steel, Inc. Petition for
Voluntary Bankruptcy
4/05/90
b) Order of Dismissal
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w

8/28/91

X

8/31/92

Y

3/03/93
9/12/91

Z

12/23/92

AA
AB

2/14/92
9/23/91
8/6/91

AC

11/29/89

In re C-H Industries, Inc. Voluntary
Petition
Amended Notice of Hearing on U.S.
Trustee's Motion to Convert or, in the
Alternative, to Dismiss Chapter 11 Case
Notice of Dismissal
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Debtor's Motion to Compel
Custodian to Turnover Property of the
Estate
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Withdrawal of Reference
Order Partially Lifting Automatic Stay
a) Affidavit of Jeffrey N. Aldous
b) Ltr from Joseph L. Wood instructing
clients to send payment for invoices to
Jeffrey P. Knauss
U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return
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I.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the brief
of the intervenor because the intervenor in substance seeks to
directly appeal from orders of the court below without filing a
notice of appeal or intervening below,1
From another perspective, intervention is an issue to be
considered in the first instance by the trial court under
U.R.C.P. 24.

In turn, this Court may review the decision of the

trial court to grant or deny intervention.2

However, C-H did not

move to intervene in the trial court at any time, even though C-H
had notice.

That is, C-H was personally served with a WRIT OF

EXECUTION on August 6, 1991 after which it elected not to pursue
its remedies in state court.

Rather, C-H pursued various

remedies in the bankruptcy courts to thwart the state court
judgments.

Inasmuch as C-H did not pursue its remedies below,

there is no legal or factual premise for this Court to ignore

1

On the cover page of its Brief, Intervenor C-H identifies
the case here as an "Appeal from the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT of
July 9, 1991 and The POST Judgment Writs . . . issued against C-H
Industries, Inc." (emphasis added). The appeal here before the
court is predicated on a NOTICE OF APPEAL dated May 9, 1991
(R. 3067-68) and a NOTICE OF APPEAL dated August 16, 1991 (R.
3433-34). In the latter, CALLAHAN identified his appeal to be
from "the final judgment (sic, JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT) . . . on
July 9, 1991 . . . including Writs of Execution and Writs of
Assistance issued August 6 and 9 of 1991." C-H obviously had
notice of the writ because it was served upon C-H. However, C-H
never attacked the writ below and never filed a notice of appeal;
so C-H seeks to appeal from decisions below without filing the
requisite notice of appeal under U.R.A.P. 3(a).
2

Under U.R.A.P. 14(d), only intervention with respect to
administrative orders is expressly permitted in this court.
1

rudimentary concepts of due process and procedure to entertain
the C-H arguments.
This Court has jurisdiction over the principal appeal by
CALLAHAN and cross-appeal by EIMCO under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992 and Supp. 1992) pursuant to U.R.A.P. 42.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

C-H has not fairly stated the issues because C-H fails to
point out that the issues it presents were not raised in the
trial court even though C-H was directly involved in the
proceedings below.
Therefore, the issues raised for review by this Court are
better characterized as follows:
1»

May C-H first seek relief from a state court writ of

execution in the bankruptcy court and, failing there, then
present an appeal attacking the writ, which appeal is denominated
intervention,
even though C-H had full knowledge of all proceedings below,
participated in the proceedings below and had the involved writ
served on it personally?

American Hous. Corp. v. Richardson, 417

P.2d 973 (Utah 1966); See also Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 774
P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989).

Intervention at the trial court level is

reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard.

Id. at 1131.

However, intervention at the appellate level appears to be an
issue of first impression and presumably will be reviewed as an
issue of law under a "correctness" standard.
2

Sandy City v. Salt

standard.

Sandy City v, Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 218

(Utah 1992); T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Utah App. 1988).
2.

May C-H's claim of lack of personal jurisdiction and

lack of notice when C-H had actual knowledge of this action and
all its proceedings, was personally served and personally
appeared in the case both before and after the events here in
issue?

Jurisdiction is presumed below and is a conclusion of law

that is reviewed for correctness.

State Dept. of Social Services

v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989); T.R.F. v. Felan. 760 P.2d
906 (Utah App. 1988).
appeal by C-H.

However, this issue was not preserved for

Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah App.

1992); Madsen v. Brown. 701 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Utah 1985).
3.

May assets of the judgment debtor G & G STEEL

transferred by CALLAHAN from G & G STEEL to C-H be the subject of
a writ of execution issued to satisfy a judgment against CALLAHAN
and G & G STEEL under U.R.C.P. 69 particularly when the transfer
to C-H was in violation of several trial court orders and where
C-H had actual knowledge of the proceedings, orders, judgments
and of the nature of the assets transferred to it from G & G
STEEL and where C-H was part of a scheme to frustrate the prior
court orders?

See Employers Mut. of Wassau v. Montrose Steel

Co., 559 P.2d 536, 537-38 (Utah 1976); Caisson Corp. v. County
West Bldcr. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 331 (E.D. Penn 1974).

Adequacy of

notice and a hearing is a matter of law reviewed for correctness.
See KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (1983).

3

4.

May C-H, a Utah corporation formed and operated by

defendant CALLAHAN through his wife IONE and his children to
avoid the judgment of the court below, and possessing assets
transferred to it in violation of several court orders, be
allowed to contest a finding of fact that C-H was the alter ego
of the defendant CALLAHAN in proceedings in which the defendant
CALLAHAN and wife IONE were parties, particularly when that
finding of fact is not required or essential to support the
action of the trial court nor is involved in the legal issues
before this Court?

Courts review judgments for correctness and

not particular findings unless essential to the judgment.

See,

e.g., Tree v. White, 171 P.2d 398 (Utah 1946); Helverina v.
Ggwran, 302 U.S. 154 (1937).
a clearly erroneous standard.

Findings of fact are reviewed under
U.R.C.P. 52(a); Bellon v. Malnar,

808 P.2d 1089, 1091-92 (Utah 1991).

III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
C-H claims a violation of "due process".

Therefore, App. A

contains the text of U.S. Constitution Amend. XIV, § 1 including
the "due process clause," and the text of Utah Const. Art. I,
§7.

No statutes are involved with the issues raised.
Several rules from Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are

pertinent, including Rule 19 on joinder, Rule 20 on permissive
joinder, Rule 21 on misjoinder, Rule 24 on intervention, and Rule
69 on execution.

Rule 12(b) pertaining to defenses and Rule

12(h) relating to the waiver of defenses are also involved in
4

some degree.

These provisions are reproduced in App. B attached

hereto.
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

C-H here seeks to intervene in order to complain principally
about a WRIT OF EXECUTION (R. 7115-17) which issued on August 6,
1991 and was thereupon personally served on C-H (R. 2312-13).3
Pursuant to the writ, the C-H assets were then seized by the
constable.4
After the C-H assets were seized, C-H opted to pursue an
18-month hiatus in the bankruptcy court and an unsuccessful
effort before that court to set aside the effect of the WRIT OF
EXECUTION.

The bankruptcy proceedings were dismissed on March 3,

1993 (App. X).
Fresh WRITS OF EXECUTION and fresh WRITS OF ASSISTANCE were
thereafter obtained on March 4, 1993 to recover some assets that
had been returned to C-H by the bankruptcy court.
C.)

(R. nnb, App.

In response, C-H this time sought relief in the court below

by filing its MOTION TO QUASH PLAINTIFF'S WRITS OF EXECUTION AND
ASSISTANCE DATED 3/4/93 (R. nnb, App. D) which motion was opposed
3

Intervenor C-H claims it "was never served with process"
in the BRIEF OF INTERVENOR C-H INDUSTRIES, INC. at page 4, line
18. The statement is erroneous, if not deliberately misleading,
because C-H was personally served with the WRIT OF EXECUTION
issued August 6, 1991 (R. 3312-15, 7115-19). The writ was and is
process. C-H was also served with the FINAL JUDGMENT (R. 294250) and other writs in this case. (See, e.g.f R. 2912-23, 300113, 3075-87, 3107-13.)
4

C-H obviously knew the writs were coming as confirmed by
the fact that upon service of the writs, its personnel were found
busy transferring $80,000 of accounts receivable to an outside
entity. (App. AB).
5

(R. nnb, App. E) and denied (R. nnb, App. F). It is not clear
whether C-H also wishes to complain about these new writs in this
"intervention.If
C-H also appears to complain about certain findings of fact
made by the trial court following the trial of CALLAHAN for
contempt.

The findings hold C-H to be the alter ego of CALLAHAN

but are not involved in any legal issue here before the Court.
(R. 3212, 5 C14, 3215, 5 4, Eimco's Main Brief, Addendum 5,
hereinafter Add. 5.)

Course of Proceedings
The BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT (hereinafter
EIMCO/s MAIN BRIEF) details the procedural history of the case
below through the FINAL JUDGMENT of March 15, 1991 (R. 2820-27,
Add. 3) and the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT of July 9, 1991 (R. 3224-26,
Add. 4.)
C-H first became involved as a participant in the case below
when it was formed by CALLAHAN with assets of G & G (R. 3212, 55
C12-13, Add. 5) in November of 1989 to succeed to the business of
defendant G & G STEEL (R. 3211, 55 C5-6, Add. 5) as part of
CALLAHAN'S effort to avoid the announced ruling of the court
against the defendants pending entry of the FINAL JUDGMENT.
3212, 5 C14, Add. 5.)

(R.

C-H's president was CALLAHAN'S wife IONE;

and both she and CALLAHAN were initial directors.

However,

CALLAHAN avoided an officer's title acting instead as general
manager (R. 3211, 5 C5-8, Add. 5). CALLAHAN was the sole
6

operating officer at the time the FINAL JUDGMENT was entered and
also at the time he was later found to be in contempt for lying
to the court under oath and for transferring the G & G assets
from G & G STEEL to C-H in violation of several court orders.
(R. 3214, f E6, 3215, f5 5-7, Add. 5.)
Following entry of the FINAL JUDGMENT on March 15, 1991
(R. 2820-27), C-H became a garnishee (R. 2912-23, 2969-70,
2990-3000, 3001-13).

One garnishment led to a dispute over debts

owed to CALLAHAN and in turn payments that C-H made to CALLAHAN.
(R. 3014-18, 3121-26.)

The dispute was resolved at a hearing on

June 10, 1991, with C-H entering an appearance through Mr. Fadel,
the attorney for CALLAHAN, G & G and HANSEN.

(R. 3201.)

The

court entered the order resolving the dispute on July 9, 1992
with C-H then again represented by counsel, Mr. Fadel.
03; App. H at 31.)

(R. 3200-

At this very same hearing, the court also

entered the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT.
On or about August 5, 1991, EIMCO applied for a WRIT OF
EXECUTION (R. 3272-73).

Before issuing the writ, the court held

a hearing on August 6, 1991 with Mr. Fadel and Mr. Wood in
attendance.

(R. nnb; August 6, 1991 Transcript at 23, App. I.)

At the hearing, the court indicated that the writ would issue;
and the court went on to state:
I'll enter the writ and then you will go ahead and —
serve it and then ownership will be determined. We'll
have a hearing. I'll give you time for hearing as to
ownership.
(August 6, 1991 Transcript at 24, App. I.)

7

Thus, all those present, including Mr. Fadel and Mr. Wood, were
put on notice to return to the court to resolve ownership issues
if there were any.
Upon issuance, the writ was personally served on C-H.
(R. 2912-23.)

All of C-H/s assets were thereupon seized by the

constable, (R. 7115-17) less the accounts receivable.
Following seizure, C-H DID NOT return to the trial court.
Rather, it went to the bankruptcy court, initiated a Chapter 11
proceeding and filed a motion to recover the seized assets.
(App. J.)

After an extended hearing (App. K ) , the bankruptcy

court ruled to return some but not all of C-H property to C-H as
trustee and debtor in possession.

Ostensibly, the bankruptcy

court did so because the Constable was still in possession of the
seized goods.
returned.

(App. L.)

As a result, selected assets were

(App. M.)

Eventually the C-H bankruptcy was dismissed.

(App. N.)

However, before dismissal, C-H caused a separate suit to be filed
against EIMCO in the federal court, (App. 0) and CALLAHAN himself
filed for bankruptcy.

(App. P.)

After dismissal of C-H's bankruptcy, EIMCO sought a fresh
WRIT OF EXECUTION on March 4, 1993, (App. C) which C-H first
attacked in federal court.

(App. Q.)

The C-H effort was

unsuccessful, (App. R) leading finally to a motion (App. D) and a
hearing before the trial court.
unsuccessful.

However, these too were

(App. F.)

8

A summary of the various cases and other matters of notable
significance follows.

A.

STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
1.

EIMCO v. G & G Steel Corp. et al.

The initial suit was

filed in August 1988 and tried by the court in October 1989. The
case was resolved by the FINAL JUDGMENT of March 15, 1991.
(R. 2820-27.)

In 1990, EIMCO acquired all G & G assets for

application to the judgment when entered.
2.

CALLAHAN v. EIMCO, et al.

(R. 3192-96.)

This is a counter-suit filed

by CALLAHAN and his wife IONE in Davis County against EIMCO and
several of its officers.

(App. S.)

It was later transferred to

Salt Lake City and consolidated with this action.

(R. 3204-05.)

It remains pending but dormant and is not involved in this
appeal.
3.

Contempt Proceedings

In the case identified in

paragraph A.l, contempt proceedings were initiated against
CALLAHAN, IONE and ex-G & G and then active C-H employees L.
Bloomquist and D. Von Mendenhall.

(R. 2384-85, 2504-05.)

The

court held CALLAHAN in contempt based on findings which included
lying to the court and transferring assets of G & G STEEL to C-H
in violation of the court's orders.

(R. 3206-16.)

A JUDGMENT OF

CONTEMPT was entered July 9, 1991 ordering CALLAHAN to turn over
all C-H assets to EIMCO.
4.

Main Appeal

(R. 3224-26.)

CALLAHAN has perfected the instant appeal

from the FINAL JUDGMENT of March 15, 1991 entered as set forth in
9

paragraph A.l.

(R. 3067-68.)

expanded injunctive relief.

EIMCO has cross appealed seeking
(R. 3117-20.)

Briefing has been

completed.
5.

Contempt Appeal

CALLAHAN separately perfected an appeal

from the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT of July 9, 1991.

(R. 3433-34.)

Briefing has been completed with the Main Appeal.
also been consolidated with the Main Appeal.
6.

The matter has

(App. U.)

Appeal Intervention

C-H obtained leave from this Court

to intervene in the appeals.

C-H filed a brief, and EIMCO filed

a Motion to Respond giving rise to this brief.
7.

Garnishment Dispute

C-H was served with a WRIT OF

GARNISHMENT, (R. 2912-23) leading to a dispute over debts owed by
C-H to CALLAHAN.

(R. 3014-20, 3062-63.)

After a hearing, C-H

was ordered to pay to EIMCO the money it had paid to CALLAHAN.
(R. 3200-03.)

B.

FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
1.

G 8c G Bankruptcy

G & G filed under Chapter 11

(reorganization) on or about November 14, 1989.
The case was dismissed in April, 1990.

(R. 2208-10.)

(App. V.)

Thereafter,

upon stipulation and by order of the court, all assets of
judgment debtor G & G were transferred to EIMCO pursuant to an
ORDER TO APPLY PROPERTY TO JUDGMENT.
2.

C-H Bankruptcy

(R. 3192-96.)

C-H filed a petition to reorganize under

Chapter 11 on or about August 28, 1991.

(App. W.)

C-H then

moved in August 1992 to recover the C-H assets seized by writ of
10

execution.

(App. Y.)

The case was dismissed on the

recommendation of the trustee and by motion of EIMCO on March 3,
1993.
3.

(App. X.)
Adversary Proceeding

As part of its bankruptcy efforts,

C-H initiated a new suit in the Federal District Court charging
EIMCO with abuse of process, misappropriation of trade secrets
and the like premised on the above-related events from 1991 to
the present.

(App. Z.)

The case is pending.

In March of 1993 a

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION was filed to restrain
enforcement of the trial court's fresh WRIT OF EXECUTION and WRIT
OF ASSISTANCE in the instant case, based on lack of jurisdiction
and due process; but the motion was denied.
4.

CALLAHAN Bankruptcy

(App. R, S.)

Mr. Callahan sought discharge of

his personal debts including the judgments of the court.
P.)

(App.

By stipulation, the bankruptcy court has stayed action on

the discharge of the FINAL JUDGMENT and JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT
pending resolution of the appeals in the Court of Appeals.

(App.

AA.)

V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

C-H did not intervene below, but has sought to intervene in
this Court of Appeals.

Intervention is a procedure for the trial

court; and there is no reason to justify this Court entertaining
C-H's intervention.
C-H presents issues not raised in the trial court and in
effect seeks to appeal under the guise of intervention.
11

However,

all these issues were argued before the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, which properly denied relief.
The issues or arguments raised should be res judicata.
The trial court had jurisdiction over C-H assets taken from
judgment debtor G & G in contempt of court to form C-H.
Execution under U.R.C.P. 69 properly reached the assets of G & G
in possession of C-H.

Formal joinder by complaint was

unnecessary.
The court has personal jurisdiction over C-H directly.

C-H

submitted to personal jurisdiction of the trial court by
appearing generally to argue on the merits on multiple occasions.
By requesting relief of the Court, C-H also submitted to
jurisdiction.
In all pertinent proceedings, C-H had actual notice and
opportunity to be heard in accordance with applicable rules.
Likewise, C-H did not object to notice in the trial court.
Thus, CALLAHAN and C-H received all due process. Any lack
thereof is directly traceable to C-H's decision to tour the
federal courts seeking redress rather than ask the trial court.
Further, C-H's actions have effectively stayed state court
proceedings and escaped or avoided the requirement to post a
bond.
C-H is not independent of the contempt in which it was
created by CALLAHAN and cannot escape justice by the mere
incantation of "incorporation."

The court was free to disregard

"corporateness" and reach all parties in order to do justice.
12

Additionally, C-H and CALLAHAN'S defense of "inability" is barred
because CALLAHAN'S and C-H's own deliberate acts created the
supposed "inability" to comply with the court's judgments.

VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

C-H IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
C-H filed a motion to intervene, which Judge Jackson

granted.

The order on its face did not make C-H an intervenor,

but merely granted the C-H motion and permitted C-H to
participate by brief and at oral argument.
EIMCO asserts that C-H cannot be an intervenor and that its
brief and arguments should be disregarded.
1.

Intervention on Appeal Is Not Permitted

Intervention is

a procedure for the trial court under U.R.C.P. 24.

Intervention

is permitted upon a timely (usually before judgment) showing that
the party has a cognizable interest in the proceedings based on
facts and circumstances of the case.

Id.; Republic Ins. Group v.

Doman. 774 P.2d 1130, 1131 (Utah 1989); United States Steel. 548
F.2d at 1235. An aggrieved party may thereafter ask review of
the trial court's decision under an Mabuse-of-discretion,f
standard.

Id.
a.

C-H had Notice Below

In this case, C-H had actual

notice because it was personally served with the Writ of
Execution about which it now complains.

It is not clear how C-H

in good faith can complain about lack of notice or due process
about a writ that was issued upon personal notice to its counsel
13

(App. AB) and about a writ that was personally served upon it.
Furthermore, C-H's founder and General Manager (CALLAHAN) had
notice.

His wife IONE also had notice; and their attorney and

C-H's attorney had notice. Mr. Wood, Gerald CALLAHAN'S son-inlaw and the new General Manager of C-H also knew because he
attended various court hearings in 1992.
It should also be noted that C-H did not seek relief below
under U.R.C.P. 69 or move to intervene below.5

Moreover, C-H

should be barred from this appeal because it had actual knowledge
of all stipulations between EIMCO and G & G, especially as to the
assets in question, yet C-H did not act to intervene.

See

American Hous. Corp. v. Richardson, 417 P.2d 973, 974 (Utah
1966).
Inasmuch as C-H had notice and was involved below as a
party, it would seem that it has been joined so that intervention
is not applicable.

Even if intervention were still required, the

trial court could still act to permit intervention even though
the appeal here is already perfected.
P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 1990).

See White v. State, 795

In short, C-H was treated like a

party below and cannot now proclaim the absence of notice or
knowledge.
b.

No Precedent Exists for Intervention on Appeal

EIMCO has not found any case or rule of this Court which squarely
addresses the question of intervention at the appellate court
5

In fact, C-H appears to have deliberately avoided
participation or intervention in the trial court as evident from
its extended pursuit of relief in the federal courts.
14

level on facts comparable or even remotely related to the facts
of this case.6

However, where intervention was sought on appeal,

it was denied.

American Hous. Corp. v. Richardson, 417 P.2d 973

(Utah 1966).

Any intervention after entry of judgment requires a

"strong showing of entitlement."

Jenner v. Real Estate Serv.f

659 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1983).

None was made here.

c.

Intervention Is Not Supported by the Facts

The

right to intervene depends heavily on the "facts and
circumstances" of each case.

See Republic Ins., 774 P.2d at

1131; American, 417 P.2d 973 (Utah 1966).

Such a fact-driven

inquiry makes intervention a uniquely inappropriate question for
an appellate court to consider7, much less to rule upon.

See,

e.g.. Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 66 F.R.D. 598, 600 (E.D. Penn.
1975).

To so rule is to prejudice parties in the case by

resolving factual and legal issues best resolved by the trial
court.

Id. at 601.

For example, the record shows that Mr. Fadel was elected as
counsel for C-H at least as early as April 1991.

(App. H at 3.)

He was actively involved in the case throughout the April to
August, 1991 time period.

He was present and acting on behalf of

C-H at the July 8, 1991 hearings and on July 9, 1991, when the
JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT was signed.

Indeed, the record is replete

with other facts establishing C-H's and counsel's total and
6

U.R.A.P. 14 does permit intervention at the appeal level
but only in relation to certain administrative proceedings.
7

This is poignantly so in this case since the intervenor
appears to have deliberately avoided participation below.
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complete knowledge.

(See, e.cr.r R. 3197, 3201, 3207, 3218, 3220,

3222, 3274, 3312.)
C-H ignores the facts in arguing that it did not have
notice.

If there is a controversy based on C-H's unsupported

allegations, a factual controversy would exist which would be
better resolved with a record below.

However, the record on its

face does not suggest any basis for C-H to first complain to this
Court.
d.

Intervention Is Not "Timelytf

trial court must be "timely.11
P.2d at 1131.
Judgment."

Intervention in a

U.R.C.P. 24; Republic Ins. f 774

Timeliness usually means "before entry of

Jenner v. Real Estate Serv., 659 P.2d 1072, 1074

(Utah 1983).

By any standard, intervention almost two years

after entry of judgment is out of the question.8
acted timely.9

C-H has not

C-H was in a position to act at any time after

November 1989 and certainly by March of 1991. With the dispute
over assets, it could have acted in July and August, 1991, but
instead elected to wait until 1993 to seek intervention.
Inasmuch as no rule permits C-H to intervene and no facts
support intervention as a matter of equity or policy, C-H's
8

United States v. United States Steel Corp., 548 F.2d 1232,
1235 (5th Cir. 1977) (intervention sought one year after entry of
order); Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 1976)
(no intervention two weeks after final hearing and still prior to
entry of order); Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 774 P.2d 1130,
1131 (Utah 1989) (intervention denied two weeks after motion for
summary judgment and one week before ruling); Jenner v. Real
Estate Serv., 659 P.2d 1072, 1073 (Utah 1983) (two weeks after
entry of default judgment was too late to intervene).
9

A fact issue better resolved below.
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participation should be terminated as untimely and without legal
or factual foundation.10
2.

C-H Is Raising New Issues for the First Time on Appeal

Few principles of law are more clear than the requirement that an
appealable issue must first be raised in the trial court.
Guardian State Bank v. Lambert, 834 P.2d 605, 608 n.2 (Utah App.
1992); Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 135859 (Utah App. 1990).
a.

O H Did Not Raise Its Issues Below

Particularly

egreqious is C-H's presentation of issues not raised in the trial
court but which could have easily been resolved there.

Mascaro

v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah 1987); Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d
922, 926 (Utah 1992); Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah
1987).

Never in the trial court did O H properly attack the

jurisdiction of the trial court or raise a question as to the due
process of the WRIT OF EXECUTION of August 6, 1991.

C-H was

served with the writ and had a hearing at which counsel for C-H
argued on August 6, 1991. (App. AB.)

C-H did not object to the

adequacy of notice and the subsequent hearings in the trial
court.11

Moreover, C-H never objected in the trial court to any

process or failure thereof under U.R.C.P. 12. Thus, C-H neither

10

EIMCO believes that the intervention is so frivolous that
it should be awarded all of its costs and attorneys fees under
U.R.A.P. 33 jointly and severally against C-H and all in concert
therewith.
11

On March 5, 1993, C-H first sought to quash fresh WRITS OF
EXECUTION that had issued on March 4, 1993.
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presented nor preserved any of the issues it now presents for
this appeal.
b.
Proceedings

C-H Had Knowledge of All Facts, Issues and
C-H cannot claim ignorance of the issues.

C-H

argued against the State District Court's jurisdiction before a
United States Bankruptcy Court (App. Y 5 15) and a United States
District Court, which properly denied relief.

(App. Q, R.)

It

argued in the bankruptcy court in 1991 that the WRIT OF EXECUTION
of August 6, 1991, was deficient.

(App. J. MEMO p. 7 5 15-17.)

It argued the same position unsuccessfully to the United States
District Court of Utah on March 5, 199 3 (App. Q, R ) . Thus, C-H
had the opportunity to raise jurisdiction and due process in the
trial court but chose to raise the issue in other fora.

It has

not preserved the issues for appeal.
c.

Issue Preclusion Applies

preclusion should apply.

Moreover, issue

Here C-H is raising issues that it

collaterally attacked, argued and lost in two other federal
courts.

Those issues should be res judicata as to C-H which had

a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" in a forum of its own
choosing.

See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois

Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
By approaching this Court as an intervenor, C-H has
sidestepped the trial court and evaded summary disposition to
which it should be subject on the grounds of res judicata or
issue preclusion.

Intervention is not a procedure that should

operate to arm the intervenor with more rights than it could have
18

had in the trial court.

Intervention should not be allowed to

"prejudice the rights of existing parties" by permitting C-H to
hide and watch, from a position of ambush to interfere with the
"orderly processes of the court."

Jenner. 659 P.2d 1072, 1074.

C-H's intervention or participation should therefore end.
B.

C-H'S ISSUES ARE MOOT
Fresh WRITS OF EXECUTION issued on March 4, 1993 (App. C),

the day after the C-H bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed.
N.)

(App.

Following service of the writs, C-H moved the trial court to

quash the writs.

(App. D.)

That is, fresh WRITS OF EXECUTION

issued in March of 1993 directed to all of the C-H assets.

C-H

then approached the trial court and presented all of its
arguments regarding those writs.

(App. F.)

The 1993 writs reach all assets of C-H.

Therefore, those

writs render all of C-H's arguments here moot.

More

specifically, if C-H assets were improperly seized in 1991,12 the
new writs and their service still take the same assets.

C-H

challenged the new writs below by motion to quash and was denied.
C-H cannot challenge those writs here until it files an appeal
from the trial court/s ruling.

Those writs are effective and not

appealed.
If C-H were to obtain relief here, the relief would be
futile.

The assets would still transfer back to EIMCO under the

later writs.

12

An argument not accepted by the bankruptcy court in 1991.
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C.

JURISDICTION OVER ASSETS OF C-H EXISTED BELOW
1.

C-H Assets Belong to Eimco Through G & G

The FINAL

JUDGMENT against G & G and in favor of EIMCO was not and has not
been satisfied.

G & G assets were ordered transferred to EIMCO

to be valued and applied to the FINAL JUDGMENT.

(R. 3192-96.)

EIMCO thus became the owner of all assets of G & Gf tangible and
intangible, including causes of action and executory contracts.
(R. 3194 5 2-6, 3195 5 2-9.)

EIMCO thus became the successor in

interest to G & G with respect to all of G i G's assets.
The trial court found the assets of C-H to be the assets of
G & G in the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT.
C.14, 3215 1 3 . )

(R. 3211 f C.6 to 3212 fl

CALLAHAN was an incorporator, (R. 3753, Exh. K

at 8, Hearing of March 29, 1991) director, (R. 3211 f C.5) and
principal beneficiary (R. 3211 f 6) of C-H, authorized to draw on
its bank account (App. H at 3) who took from G & G the assets
with which he formed C-H.

(R. 3212 ffC.12-14, 3215 f 3.)

He was

ordered to cause the assets of C-H to be turned over to EIMCO.
(R. 3215 f 10)

He did not.

^

A transferee of converted property may not obtain greater
title to that property than the transferor owned but is likewise
liable.

Restatement (second) of Torts § 229.

CALLAHAN converted

the intangible assets of G & G STEEL and transferred them to C-H
to form C-H.

(R. 3211-12.)

CALLAHAN had no right to take the

assets of G & G, especially without compensation to G & G.
3212 f C.12-14.)
CALLAHAN.

(R.

C-H cannot have a greater right than did

Thus, the order to transfer C-H's assets to EIMCO was
20

proper, since all rights in the C-H assets were properly in EIMCO
as successor in interest to G & G.

C-H is liable to transfer all

assets to EIMCO as ordered.
2.

Rule 69 Reached Assets of G & G in C-H's Possession

A writ of execution is simply the process by which the court
enforces its judgment.

U.R.C.P. 69(a).

Moreover, a party having

a judgment in its favor has a clear right to have the judgment
enforced.

Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, 48 Utah 214, 159 P.

541, 544 (1916).

No discretion is vested in the trial court

whether or not it will enforce a judgment.

Id.

For a writ of execution to issue under U.R.C.P. 69, no
written motions, notices, or orders of the court are required.
Writs of execution are simply issued by the Clerk of the Court
pursuant to a judgment.

U.R.C.P. 69(b).

The trial court had jurisdiction over the assets of judgment
debtor G & G, (R. 2821 f 1. Add. 3) which assets were taken in
contempt of court to form C-H.
3214 f F.2, Add. 5.)

(R. 3211 f C.6 to 3212 5 C.14; R.

Thus, the trial court could properly reach

the assets of G & G in C-H's possession.

Nevertheless, C-H

ignored the order of the trial court and made no attempt to
transfer the assets.
In this case, the trial court PERSONALLY arranged for a
hearing on August 6, 1991, (App. AB) following EIMCO's request to
issue the writ of execution against the assets of C-H on August
5, 1993. Thus, due process was honored.

Further, on the record

the trial court invited C-H to contest ownership on August 6,
21

1993.

(App. I at 23-24.)

Even if the court had been silent,

U.R.C.P. 69(j) and (o) would then, and do now, provide the party
O H with rights to present its views and secure relief below.

C-

H elected to tour the federal courts instead and cannot now be
heard to protest the absence of due process.13
D.

C-H SUBMITTED TO JURISDICTION BELOW
C-H made numerous general appearances and went directly to

the merits of its case in each instance, never arguing against
personal jurisdiction of the court.
1.

It is now bound.

All Appearances are Effectively General Appearances

Although C-H makes some show of appearing "specially" here, all
appearances seeking relief are general.

Ted R. Brown & Assoc.,

Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206 (Utah 1976); Barber v. Calder,
522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974).

Moreover, anyone appearing to argue

jurisdiction before a court is bound by the ruling of the court
as to jurisdiction.

See, e.g., Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling Men's

Ass^n, 283 U.S. 522, 524-26 (1931).

The only proper way not to

be bound by a court's jurisdiction is not to appear at all and
collaterally attack jurisdiction.

See Id.

C-H did collaterally

attack the state court's jurisdiction, and lost.
court, C-H appeared and argued on the merits.

In the trial

C-H is now bound

by both state and federal courts' actions.
2.

C-H Appeared and Argued on The Merits

It is a well

established principal of law that one cannot seek relief of a
13

In EIMCO's view, C-H and its principals have used the
legal system to create barriers to frustrate the judgments and
orders of the trial court which act is itself contemptuous.
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court and still spurn its jurisdiction.
at 207.

Ted R. Brown, 547 P.2d

C-H cannot simultaneously argue that the court's powers

should be wielded in its favor and that it is not subject to
those powers.
Appearing before the court to argue on the merits
establishes jurisdiction.

Id.

C-H submitted to personal

jurisdiction of the trial court by appearing generally on
numerous occasions to argue on the merits.
C-H appeared before the trial court as a garnishee to
justify its answers to interrogatories served with a WRIT OF
GARNISHMENT.

(R. 3201.)

C-H also was served with a WRIT OF

EXECUTION and a motion therefor.

(R. 3312-13.)

C-H appeared on

August 6, 1991f to answer under U.R.C.P. 69 as a possessor of
assets of judgment debtor G & G and Mr. Fadel then argued for C-H
to be relieved from issuance of that WRIT OF EXECUTION.
3274.)

C-H again appeared on May 28, 1993 to argue a motion

seeking to quash other writs of execution.
3.

(R.

The Case Caption is Not Controlling

(App. F.)
Here, C-H

predicates its arguments on the concept that it was not a party
to the proceedings below, notwithstanding its selective, vigorous
participation.

The argument is without merit, considering that

C-H actively participated below but was simply not specifically
listed on the pleading as a party, non-party, interested third
party or under some other nomenclature.
garnishee.

(R. 3014, 3062.)

It was listed as a

The law is not so shallow as to pay

homage to the form or style of the pleadings over C-H's
23

substantive involvement both directly through elected counsel
present at all proceedings as well as through CALLAHAN, MR. WOOD
and IONE CALLAHAN, his wife.
4.

Formal Joinder Is Not Required for Jurisdiction

C-H confuses jurisdiction and joinder.

The purpose of

U.R.C.P. 19 to guard against entry of judgments which might
prejudice absent parties was clearly met in this case without
formal joinder.

Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049 (Utah

App.), cert, denied 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).

C-H was never

absent from any pertinent proceeding.
In arguing lack of jurisdiction and notice, C-H appears to
argue that it was not properly joined by service of a summons and
complaint under U.R.C.P. 19.

Such joinder is not required to

bind a party or non-party and its lack is not a jurisdictional
defect.

See U.R.C.P. 69(l-o); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795

P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990).

Heref due process was satisfied each time

C-H appeared in court.

Mr. Fadel was elected counsel for C-H in

April 1991 and was authorized to stand in the place of C-H to
defend its interests and assert its claims.

See, e.g., Landes

795 P.2d 1127.
C-H should not be heard to claim that counsel was blind to
C-H's interests where counsel had all facts in the case, was
involved from the beginning and argued for G & G, CALLAHAN and
C-H at the various proceedings.
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E.

DUE PROCESS WAS SATISFIED
In all proceedings, C-H had actual notice and opportunity to

be heard.

Moreover, notice and hearings comported with

applicable rules.

Thus, C-H's arguments that EIMCO violated due

process are groundless.
1.

C-H Received Notice
a.

Counsel for C-H had Notice

C-H decided to retain

George Fadel as counsel at least as early as April, 1991.
H at 3.)

(App.

George Fadel represented CALLAHAN and G & G since the

beginning of this action.

(R. 0111-12.)

Mr. Fadel thus knew all

the pertinent facts, received each pleading and was otherwise on
notice of all issues in the case.
b.

C-H Received Notice of All Pertinent Proceedings

The principle of notice is that the means chosen should be
reasonably calculated to give actual notice.

Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

The cases on the

constitutionality of notice revolve around a means which has
failed to give actual notice and whether one giving notice should
be relieved of using more certain or different or more expensive
means.14
Here C-H received actual notice.
principals of G & G.

The principals of C-H were

(R. 3210 f B.8-11, 3211 f C.3-8.) The

principals of G & G were joined and named defendants.

14

The

Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485
U.S. 478 (1988). See e.g., Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,
462 U.S. 791 (1983); Greene v. Lindsey. 456 U.S. 444 (1982);
Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1950).
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defendants received notice of all proceedings routinely as
required under U.R.C.P. 5(a). Thus, the principals of C-H
received actual notice of all proceedings.
C-H was served with WRITS OF GARNISHMENT.

(R. 3074; 3133.)

A FIRST WRIT OF EXECUTION (R. 3312-13) and a second set of WRITS
OF EXECUTION.

(R. nnb, App. C.)

As discussed, C-H appeared

through counsel in this case; and counsel for C-H was on notice
in every instance, particularly since counsel represented
CALLAHAN and G & G from the beginning.
C-H thus has nothing of which to complain, having had
technical notice under U.R.C.P. 69 (j) and actual notice.
2.

C-H Appeared

An adequate hearing should be at a

meaningful time and place.
denied 409 U.S. 902 (1972).

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, rehfQ
Counsel for C-H argued at the

hearing on July 8, 1991 which resulted in the JUDGMENT OF
CONTEMPT.

(R. 7240.)

C-H was also earlier represented by Mr. Fadel before the
trial court at a garnishment hearing.

(R. 3201.)

C-H was

likewise represented at the hearing of August 6, 1991, prior to
issuance of a WRIT OF EXECUTION.

(R. nnb, App. C at 1.)

C-H was

offered an additional hearing as to ownership of assets seized
pursuant to the WRIT OF EXECUTION of August 6, 1991.
App. I. at 24.)

(R. nnb,

Declining to take that offer, C-H waited until

after its tour of the federal courts ended in failure and EIMCO
again sought new WRITS OF EXECUTION.

Then C-H moved

unsuccessfully to quash the writs in the trial court.
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(App. F.)

C-H cannot claim that its counsel, Mr. Fadel, was unaware of
and unprotective of the interests of C-H.

Moreover, given the

policy of notice pleadings under U.R.C.P. 1 and 8, C-H cannot
claim ignorance of the nature and extent of its liability, or of
an inability to defend itself at a meaningful time and place.
3.

Equity Will Not Support Relief for C-H Because

"Corporateness" Is No Shield for Injustice

C-H is not

independent of the contempt in which it was created by CALLAHAN,
notwithstanding C-H's claim that it was impossible for CALLAHAN
to comply with the court7s JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT.
a.

Inability is No Defense Here

Deliberate acts

causing inability to comply bar a defense of impossibility.
Brown v. Cook, 260 P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1953).
CALLAHAN formed C-H and moved in and out of positions of
authority therein. (App. G. at 3, App. H at 3.)

Such deliberate

conduct cannot be used to create an "impossibility" defense.
Specifically, impossibility of performance is not a defense as of
the date of adjudication of contempt where CALLAHAN had the
ability to perform as of the time that the court's subject
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER was entered.
627 P.2d 528, 530-31 (Utah 1981).

Bradshaw v. Kershaw,

The subject order was entered

in written form in November, 1989 shortly after trial.
23.)

(R. 2220-

As in Bradshaw, CALLAHAN was removing himself from his

positions of authority in C-H at least as late as April, 1991.
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(App. H at 3.)

Thus, CALLAHAN'S claim of impossibility or

inability fails.15
b.

The Court Can Reach Assets of G & G Anywhere

C-H

cannot escape the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT, because the court was
free to seek out all the property of G & G in the hands of
parties and strangers to the action and transfer it to EIMCO.
U.R.C.P. 69 (l)-(o).

Thus, it makes no difference whether C-H is

even related to, let alone the same entity as CALLAHAN for C-H's
assets to be reached.

Because the property in C-H's possession

belongs to another, the property must be transferred as ordered.
C-H tries to show itself independent of CALLAHAN (for
purposes of liability on the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT), on the one
hand, and as an identical entity (for purposes of bankruptcy
stays), on the other.

C-H need not be identical to CALLAHAN for

the court to reach it directly, but such pleading of alternate
facts is not permitted.
c.

The Courts Are Not Hindered by "Corporateness"

C-H cannot escape justice by the mere incantation of
"incorporation."
1.

Incorporation Alone Conveys No Rights

The law

is well settled that "incorporation" cannot be used to work an
15

CALLAHAN has also effectively circumvented the court's
contempt power below, by this intervention of C-H. That is,
where the purpose of a finding of contempt is to cause compliance
with the orders of the court, no appeal can be taken until the
contemnor purges himself of contempt. See Von Hake v. Thomas,
759 P.2d 1162, 1167 n.2, 1168-1169 (Utah 1988). Yet, here stands
C-H (in lieu of CALLAHAN) arguing the very right to possession of
the assets in question and questioning the contempt finding of
the court.
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injustice, under any guise.16

The analysis need not be tortured.

The corporation is simply a convenient, shorthand reference
for a bundle of juristic relations.17
inherent rights of itself.

The term conveys no

A corporation is not a "person".

Such a metaphor is improper here.

As Cardozo pointedly directed,

the "metaphors in the law are to be narrowly watched."

Berkey v.

Third Avenue Rv., 244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926),
reh'g. denied 244 N.Y. 602, 155 N.E. 914 (1927).
ignore "the tests of honesty and justice."

Id.

We cannot
The doctrines of

16

See Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1987)
"It is one thing to observe the corporate fiction as if the
fiction were truth — when the fiction is not abused. It is
quite a different thing when the sole stockholder
uses the
corporate fiction as an instrument of deceit." Mavo v. Pioneer
Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 1959). The cases
"all come to just this — courts simply will not let
interposition of corporate entity or action prevent a judgment
otherwise required. . . . The process is not accurately termed
one of disregarding the corporate entity. It is rather only a
refusal to permit its presence and action to divert the judicial
course of applying law to ascertained facts. The method neither
pierces any veil nor goes behind any obstruction, save for its
refusal to let one fact bar the judgment which the whole sum of
facts requires." In re Clarke's Will 284 N.W. 876, 878 (Minn.
1939)
"The fiction is only resorted to for working out the lawful
objectives of the corporation. It is never resorted to when it
would work an injury to any one, or allow the corporation to
perpetrate a fraud upon anybody." United States v. Milwaukee
Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F.247, 254 (E.D. Wis. 1905).
17

See Farmer'& Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 222 N.Y.S. 532,
543 (N.Y. S.Ct. 1927) (An exposition and holding on the functions
and rights associated with the corporate form as a convenient
instrument of business, subject to regulation. As merely a short
mode of describing a complex process of working out the benefits
and burdens of corporate members, it is not an entity but a
useful collection of jural relations.) See also, Harry G. Henn
and John R. Alexander Laws of Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises (3d ed.) Ch. 7 at 344, 346, 349, 353 West (Hornbook
Series) (1983).
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"alter ego" and "piercing the corporate veil" sit amid a host of
expressions used by the courts to describe the process of
preventing injustice, fraud, or contempt of the court under the
guise of "incorporation."18
2.

C-H Fits the Elements of Alter Eao

The

doctrine of alter ego or its equivalent is equitable in nature,
depends on a consideration of several suggested factors and is
thus determined on the peculiar facts of each case.

Salt Lake

City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah App.
1988) . The two prongs of the test are a "unity of interest"19
and "unfairness."

Id.

The court below found unity of interests between C-H and
CALLAHAN.

(See R. 3211-12 , 7265-72.)

Moreover, all that is

required under the most stringent interpretation is flawed
formalities and a showing that a failure to disregard
"corporateness" would result in an injustice.20

Here, C-H was

founded to simply take over the G & G business, to disadvantage

18

Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander Laws of Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises (3d. ed.) Ch. 7 at 344 n. 2 West
(Hornbook Series) (1983).
19

A unity of interest is often evidenced by lack of
corporate formalities, but formalities are not the test, only one
test applicable in many circumstances. See Messick v. PHD
Trucking Service, Inc., 678 P.2d 791 (Utah 1984). Thus, even
fastidious attention to formalities would be of no effect here,
where the entire purpose of any formalities was to do an
injustice with impunity.
20

Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1987). A
court of equity looks through form to substance and may consider
certain factors deemed significant, not conclusive, including the
use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice. Id.
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EIMCO and to evade court orders and rulings.

The court below

found great unfairness and inequity in CALLAHAN'S conduct21,
which created and continued injustice by circumventing the
court7s judgments in a manner rising to the level of contempt.
(R. 3214-16.)
3.
the Parties

"Corporateness" Cannot Prevent Justice Among

C-H's status as a corporation cannot stand in the

way of justice among the parties.22 Those parties include EIMCO,
C-H, G & G and CALLAHAN.

The trial court decided that C-H was a

sham formed to circumvent the court's orders.
see also transcript at R. 7265-66, 7269-72.)

(R. 3212 f C14 ,
C-H's argument that

it cannot be reached since it is not identically or literally
CALLAHAN remains unsupported because behind the corporate curtain
it is CALLAHAN who is still telling us that we cannot approach
C-H.

The trial court need not sit idly by as CALLAHAN and C-H in

contempt disobey the courts' processes.
4.

C-H Must Comply With The Judgment of Contempt

and Turn Over Assets to EIMCO
C-H must comply with the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT and the
several underlying temporary restraining orders of the trial

21

Incidentally, the adequacy of a corporations capital
weighs heavily in the unfairness prong. Salt Lake City Corp. v.
James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 47 n. 10 (Utah App. 1988). C-H
made arguments that it was capitalized by other members of
CALLAHAN'S family, not CALLAHAN himself. That capital amounted
to a few thousand dollars against annual sales of $866,400.00 by
C-H. (App. AC.)
22

Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 830 (5th
Cir. 1959); In re Clarke's Will 284 N.W. 876, 878 (Minn. 1939).
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court.

The restraints ran to CALLAHAN and "all those in active

consort or participation therewith who receive actual notice
hereof".

(R. 2221.)

C-H had actual notice and is bound by the

restraints.
Moreover, the underlying order is not subject to
reconsideration here, firstly because the issue was not preserved
for appeal, and secondly because no contempt proceeding may
effect a retrial of the underlying order.

Bradshaw, 627 P.2d at

532 (citing Macrcrio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 69 (1948)).
merely "foster experimentation with disobedience."

Such would

Id.

Thus,

C-H's claim of CALLAHAN'S inability to comply with the JUDGMENT
OF CONTEMPT does not free C-H of its liability or obligation to
comply with the JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT and turn over all its
remaining assets to EIMCO.

IV.

CONCLUSION

This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider C-H's
position because C-H has not filed a Notice of Appeal.

In other

words, C-H has not preserved its issues for appeal, and thus
should not be heard.

It is and was a party below, and must

appeal as all other parties.

This court should therefore dismiss

the intervention of C-H as improper and untimely, leaving C-H to
seek any remaining remedy in the trial court.
C-H has dragged others through a multiplicity of
proceedings in the federal courts, and should not now be released
from the judgments of those very courts in which it has appeared.
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That is, C-H is bound by the decision of the federal courts
resolving the issues here raised against C-H and in favor of
EIMCO.
C-H has had all possible due process, with notice and a
hearing at every juncture.

Meanwhile, C-H even now prejudices

EIMCO by squandering resources in a forum lacking jurisdiction
over intervention.

C-H should be made to cease these frivolous

proceedings and answer for the contempt in which it was formed.
Further, EIMCO should be awarded damages against C-H and it
counsel jointly and severally under U.R.C.P. 11 and U.R.A.P. 33
for pursuit of this intervention which is not fairly grounded and
which has been interposed to further delay this litigation and
harass EIMCO.
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